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1 Introduction
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon affecting all societies to different
degrees, at different times.On the one hand, as corruption scandals have repeat-
edly shown, bribes are common in all countries notwithstanding differences in
income levels and law systems, as they are common in democracies and in dic-
tatorships. Recent scandals over corruption have shown that also supposedly
free-from-corruption societies are affected. TheELF scandal demonstrated that
corruption was rampant in the management of the French state owned enter-
prise.1 The following year, a corruption charge against President Chirac could
not be courted because he was shielded by immunity as the head of the state.2
Also in Germany, the CDU and former Chancellor Helmut Kohl were fined
for receiving illegal campaign funding.3 Among Nordic countries (which rank
always among the less corrupt in international comparisons), Swedish and Nor-
wegian managers of state owned companies have been found to be involved
in bribe-taking.4 Corruption is not rare even during humanitarian emergen-
cies. According to Transparency International, an NGO who strives to expose
corruption, relief efforts in the aftermath of the South East Asian Tsunami
earthquake of 2004 were hampered by corruption.5
Still, different countries are marked by large differences to the extent of
corruption. In some societies, no transaction is finalized without corruption
having an effect, while in other countries it is considered an exception and
rarely tolerated. Figure 1 presents corruption levels worldwide; the figure shows
that corruption tends to be pervasive especially in developing countries. At
the same time, numerous studies have demonstrated the pernicious effects of
corrupted practices on—among other things—economic growth, investment,
human development and environmental policies. The relevance of corruption
for welfare levels requires the understanding of the sources of corruption (and
of differences across countries) and the development of policies to address the
phenomenon of corruption.
Hard evidence of corruption is intrinsically difficult to obtain, because of the
secrecy surrounding illegal deals, but there are several ways to obtain proxies
of the extent of corruption. One such source comes from the pool of inter-
national interviews commissioned for the Global Corruption Perception Baro-
meter (Transparency International, 2004). From the barometer, we can see that
while around 90% of Brazilians think that petty and grand corruption are ‘very
big problems’, around 50% of Finnish interviewees think that petty corruption
is ‘no problem at all’ and around 35% think that also grand corruption is no
problem. With respect to the personal experiences of individuals with bribery,
1 On the ELF scandal see The Washington Post, Wednesday, February 9, 2000; Page A21.
2 http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/10/chirac.court/.
3 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_48/b3759151. htm.
4 Corruption Blackens Nordic Region’s Lily-White Image, Agence France Presse, December 4,
2003.
5 http://www.transparency. org/pressreleases_archive/2005/faq_tsunami.html#faqti1.
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Fig. 1 A higher score (a darker color) indicates higher corruption perception. Our elaboration on
data from Kaufmann et al. (2005)
we see that more than 50% of Cameroon’s interviewees admit that somebody
in their household paid a bribe in the last 12months, while among Austrian,
Canadian, German and Irish interviewees only 1% mentioned exposure to
corruption for their households in the last year.
Evidence on private firms’ expenditures for bribes is available from the
World Business Environment Survey 2000.6 From the executives’ interviews in
the survey, we see for example that while more than 90% of Canadian firms
declare that they did not pay any bribes in the last year, none of the Armenian
and Azerbaijani firms interviewed declared so.
Once we consider the negative effects of corruption on welfare, an obvi-
ous research question arises: what is the reason for corruption to be common
in some countries while other countries succeed to prevent corruption from
hampering their welfare? While theoretical literature on this subject abounds,
empirical studies are relatively scarce. Since several indexes of corruption per-
ception have become available over the last few years, it is now possible to test
statistically some of the ideas from the theoretical literature. To the knowledge
of the authors, themost comprehensive andwidely cited econometric analysis of
the sources of corruption is a cross-sectional study from Treisman (2000).7 The
study takes into consideration and tests empirically a wide range of theoretical
explanations of corruption and finds mostly ‘fixed factors’ as the determinants
of corruption. That is, the significant explanatory variables are all persistent
over time, impossible to change in the short and medium run. The most pol-
icy-amenable variable is the ‘exposition to democracy for more than 46 years’.
As the sources of corruption are persistent, corruption itself will remain stable
over time and can hardly be affected by policies; corrupted countries should
6 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/.
7 This relatively recent paper has been already cited in 59 other works according to ISI Web of
Science (checked on the 18th September 2005).
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rather learn to live with it. Treisman’s study will be the point of departure of
our work.8
Previous and subsequent empirical studies—mostly cross sectional—have
focused more on single issues where the authors have tested a particular the-
ory by inserting a proxy for a specific variable into multiple regressions. These
studies most often produced results that confirmed the theories that were tested
and, while they are valuable contributions for the identification of likely sources
of corruption, they may have over-emphasized the importance of the variables
analyzed because of omitted variables biases.
Several studies focused on the role of democracy as a determinant of cor-
ruption (among the most recent: Sung 2004; Chowdhury 2004 and Bohara et al.
2004), some focused on regulatory burden and economic freedom (Chafuen
and Guzmàn 1999), others have focused on decentralization and federalism
(e.g. Fisman and Gatti 2002; Arikan 2004), on natural resources prevalence as
a source of income in the economy (Leite and Weidmann 1999), and on legal
origins of a country as a determent of corruption (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002).
In our paper we will first provide a systematic overview of different theories
on the causes of corruption. In this survey, presented in Sect. 2, we distinguish
theories that focus on historical roots versus theories that givemore attention to
contemporary causes. Thereafter, wewill assess the different theories and calcu-
late our own estimates of the sources of corruption in a comprehensive econo-
metric model, using indexes of corruption that have become available recently
(Kaufmann et al. 2005) and we will cover a large sample of countries. Fur-
thermore, we will make use of some independent variables that are improved
proxies for the variables that theory would suggest. The empirical contribution
of this paper is threefold. First, due to improved data availability, we can work
with a larger data sample that give more power to our statistical tests com-
pared to earlier studies.9 Second, we have a large set of independent variables
available that we can test jointly so that we do not suffer from omitted variable
bias, a problem of many previous and partial studies that may have overem-
phasized the importance of the variables under consideration. This advantage
is particularly valuable as it helps us to assess the importance of long-lived ver-
sus contemporary causes of corruption, while these sources of corruption have
mostly been assessed independently, so far. Thirdly, a crucial advantage over
previous authors is the availability of two alternative corruption indexes, which
can be used for robustness checks of the findings. Section 3 describes the data
that we use for our own econometric analysis, Sect. 4 introduces and discusses
the econometric estimates, and Sect. 5 concludes.
8 Lambsdorff 1999 provides a comprehensive survey of earlier empirical results.
9 Specifically, when we compare our study to Treisman’s, we find that our sample is larger than 100
countries in most regressions, while Treisman’s sample size is between 44 and 64 countries in the
majority of regressions.
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2 Theories of corruption’s determinants
Theories of corruption’s determinants (andmore generally of the quality of gov-
ernment) abound. We will take as a starting point the theories on the sources of
corruption that are mentioned in Treisman (2000) and La Porta et al. (1999) as
those studies are considered a benchmark in the literature and they provided a
powerful battery of empirical tests. To these wewill add themost recent findings
of empirically backed literature in order to test and build upon their findings.
The subsequent econometric estimates will follow a similar approach.
2.1 Historical roots of corruption
Among the theories that relate the history of countries to their present day
levels of corruption, legal theories suggest that the kind of law codes that are in
place in a country affect the quality of government, including the level of con-
trol of corruption. Historically motivated theories trace the effort of property
owners to limit the discretionary power of the Crown as the origin of common
law legal codes (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002). Furthermore, they suggest that the
actions of the independent judiciary system in countries that adopted the Brit-
ish law code will be conductive to lower levels of corruption (for a discussion
in depth, see La Porta et al. 1999).
Another theory, also based on the historical roots of corruption, is one that
sees former British colonies as having a better civil service code due to the
influence of the British bureaucracy. In this system, the British civil servant
is focused on procedural aspects of the law, which enhances the capability of
subordinates and judges to challenge hierarchies in order to enforce the law
(Treisman 2000). However, as a result of the method with which colonization
was imposed upon countries, this positive effect of British colonization can be
questioned. Quoting Macaulay (1843/2001)’ the business of a servant of the
[East India] Company was simply to wring out of the natives a hundred or two
hundred thousand pounds as speedily as possible, that he might return home
before his constitution had suffered from the heat, to marry a peer’s daughter,
to buy rotten boroughs in Cornwall, and to give balls in St. James’s Square’.10
If British colonizers were extracting resources, in addition to establishing legal
procedures, the effect of colonization on present corruption deserves to be
tested.
Another hypothesis, which has been put under scrutiny in previous literature,
is that Protestant religion, being relatively less hierarchical when compared to
other churches and religions (such as the Orthodox and Catholic churches and
Muslims), is less prone to tolerance towards power abuses and corruption. Fur-
thermore, the Protestant church has traditionally been apart from the state and
played a role of opposition to the abuses of the government (Treisman 2000).
10 Macaulay was in India working for the Supreme Council of India and later became a member
of the British Parliament.
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Thus this theory suggests that Protestant countries will be less affected by cor-
ruption.
Also pointing at long-living causes of corruption are those theories that sug-
gest that more ethnically fractionalized countries tend to be more corrupted
(Mauro 1995). One root of the link between ethnolinguistic fractionalization
and corruption can be existence of alternative affiliations and obedience with
respect to the state. Thus, in ethnically divided societies civil servants and politi-
cians would exploit their positions to favor members of their own ethnic group.
Another possible explanation for the effect that ethnolinguistic fractionaliza-
tion would have on corruption is due to the fact that divided societies tend to
under-provide public goods and this, in turn, would augment the dependency
on special bounds to obtain essential services from the state.
2.2 Contemporary causes of corruption
Another set of theories relates the level of corruption to institutions, economic
structures, and the level of development. These theories provide more of an
entrance for anti-corruption policy compared to the theories based on historic
variables, as there are some policy-amenable factors among the determinants of
corruption. To start with, income levels may affect corruption in several ways.
Richer countries can be expected to afford better institutions. Furthermore,
many variables correlated with income, such as schooling levels, urbanization
and access to mass media, are associated with higher development levels and
they decrease the tolerance of the polity towards corruption. It may need some
development to recognize corruption as a violation of the border between the
public and the private sphere. Thus we expect a real income variable to be neg-
atively correlated with corruption, where causality may run in both directions.
The rent-seeking literature emphasizes the link between corruption and pos-
sibilities for economic agents to gain access to sources of higher-than-average
rents, when state intervention prevents free entry (see Rose-Ackerman 1999).
In this perspective, the fight against corruption is helped with a reduction of
non-generic state regulation. Thus, corruption would be associated to the size
of government activities (Chafuen and Guzmàn 1999; Acemoglu and Verdier
2000). On a similar train of thought, openness to trade and increasing supply
of foreign products on the domestic market enhances domestic competition,
thereby reducing rents and corruption. Conversely, trade-barriers increase the
opportunities for earning extra rents by gaining access to trade allowances,
stimulating corruption.
Natural resources are a common source of high rents, available to those
that have obtained the rights for their exploration and extraction. These rents
promote activities aiming at influencing policy makers who have power on the
distribution of exploitation rights, drawing away resources from other produc-
tive activities (La Porta et al. 1999). Thus natural resources abundance would be
associated to higher corruption, though we cannot take this effect for granted
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since revenues from natural resources could also be used in order to produce
public goods, decreasing the need to revert to bribing in order to access them.
Another strand of the literature considers the relation between social institu-
tions and corruption, starting with democracy. A negative correlation between
democracy and corruption is tautological when based on a substantial definition
of democracy, since corruption favors the interests of the individual, or a minor-
ity, as opposed to the interests of the majority. Once we consider democracy
from a procedural perspective (free elections and electoral competitions) the
association is less straightforward. Most indexes of democracy are based on the
procedural aspects of democracy, and previous empirical studies have found
contrasting results. Many papers that focus on democracy and employ few con-
trol variables find contemporary democracy to decrease corruption levels (e.g.
Hill 2003; Chowdhury 2004; Bohara et al. 2004), while more comprehensive
studies do not find such a correlation (Treisman 2000). The experience of some
Latin American countries suggests that the transition to democracy did not
produce much of a dividend in terms of a reduction in corruption. A telling
example is Mexico. Up to 2000, the country was ruled for seven decades by
the PRI, known for its cronies and patronage system. Then, for the first time, a
president was elected that was not from the PRI. This was considered a turning
point for Mexican democracy, but the following years were marked by cor-
ruption scandals that affected virtually all political parties, including the ruling
party (the PAN, which has gained power on its platform promoting change and
a fight against corruption),11 the former ruling party PRI, the other opposition
party (the PRD)12 and even the marginal ecologist party.13 Also in Europe,
cases of corruption in long-established democracies abound; the above-men-
tioned high-level scandals in France are one example. As another example, Italy
scores very high on all indexes of corruption, despite having been a democracy
with high levels of electoral competition for six decades.
Looking at democracy, not from a procedural but from a dynamics point of
view, leads us to political stability as another variable that may affect corrup-
tion levels. In politically stable administrations, bureaucrats face less chances
of dismissal and have more opportunity for long-run advancement in their
careers, which provides an incentive to build an open and honest reputation for
a career development. On the other hand, a permanent position in power may
help maintain ‘patronage and corruption’ reputations and relations. There are
therefore two alternative and contradictory hypotheses on whether corruption
is discouraged or fostered by political stability (Treisman 2000).
Apart from the duration of a job in the administration, the wages may also
affect the vulnerability to corruption. Higher wages imply higher costs when
11 President Fox has been accused of using illegal funds to finance his campaign, see
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_2802000/2802161. stm.
12 On the tape-scandals, involving themost important aides of LopezObrador, see http://news.bbc.
co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_3531000/3531475.stm.
13 On the scandal involving the young leader of the Partido Verde Ecologista, see http://www.
esmas.com/noticierostelevisa/mexico/345598.html.
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a position in the civil service is lost, and a cost-benefit analysis suggests that
higher wages thereby provide an incentive to restrain from corruption (Becker
1968; Treisman 2000).
Finally, we look at a rather different institutional variable, recently studied
in both theoretical and empirical work: the extent of newspaper circulation,
where the press is supposed to act as a check on those that should represent the
public interest (Brunetti and Weder 2003). The hypothesis claims that corrup-
tion scandals being freely enquired and exposed by the mass medias, acts as a
deterrent for bureaucrats to engage in corruption activities.
3 Data sources on corruption
In this section we describe our dataset and the underpinning concept of corrup-
tion. The other variables will be described below as they are introduced in the
econometric analysis. The variables’ sources are listed in theAppendix together
with their descriptive statistics.
The assessment of corruption levels across countries is a formidable empirical
challenge as corruption is difficult to define uniformly, being culturally deter-
mined, and even more difficult to measure, because illegality implies secrecy.
Wewill use data that complies with the general definition of “abuse of power for
personal gains”14 from theWorld Bank15 (Kaufmann et al. 2005) and Transpar-
ency International.16 The two datasets are similar in the sense that they gather
existing measures on the perception of corruption, and produce an aggregate
index. In this paper, we will use the data from the World Bank in the main
analysis and the index from Transparency International as a robustness check.
The individual indexes aggregated in order to create the proxies of corrup-
tion (or, more precisely of corruption’s perception), range from Gallup’s opin-
ion surveys—where a sample of the polity is asked how common corruption is
and at what scale it operates—to surveys of company executives that estimate
the share of their companies’ revenues that are spent in bribes.17 On the one
hand, the high correlation of the aggregated indexes, originated from different
sources, gives some confidence on the fact that they are correct proxies for cor-
ruption. On the other hand, it should be noted that the definition of corruption
can be interpreted differently in different cultural contexts and that there can
be ‘emotionally driven’ answers to survey: thus, while a corruption scandal is
escalating, the interviewees will possibly overrate the level of corruption, just
as when the economy is booming interviewees can have a more positive atti-
tude also about the government and the civil servants. While some of these
14 For an overview of complexities and the evolution in social sciences of the definition of corrup-
tion see Williams 1999.
15 Available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html.
16 Available at http://www.icgg.org/.
17 For a full description of all the sources and of the aggregation methodology used by the World
Bank, see Kaufmann et al. 2005; for sources and methodology of the Transparency International
index, see Lambsdorff 2004.
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concerns are taken care of by the way the polls are realized and aggregated, a
margin of uncertainty is inevitable (see Kaufmann et al. 2005). Furthermore,
as it has been shown extensively in the empirical literature, even though these
indexes may define the perception of corruption over its essence, it appears
that perceptions have an impact on the economy and that the indexes have a
high explanatory power when used as independent variables in econometric
analyses (for a review see Jain 2001). Lastly, from the descriptive statistics of
Table 2, note that the corruption index has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of around 1.18 Thus our results can be easily interpreted in standardized form.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section we provide cross-country estimates of the sources of corrup-
tion, highlighting where and why our data and results differ from previous
studies. Following Treisman’s (2000) methods, we will firstly test the hypoth-
eses—already summarized in the previous section—based on the more stable
variables and subsequently include variables that can change over time and
that can more easily be influenced by public policies. Our preferred estima-
tion technique is weighted least squares regressions, where the weights of the
estimates are the reciprocal of the margins of errors of the corruption index
for each individual observation (as estimated by Kaufmann et al. 2005). Thus,
the estimates of corruption perception that are more uniform across sources
are considered more reliable and get a higher weight in the regressions.19 The
dataset on corruption perception is very extended and includes a number of
very small countries with typical features (e.g. having an attractive investment
climate) that can easily lead to selection bias in our results.20 For this reason,
we omit from the empirical analysis countries that have less than 1,000,000
inhabitants.
We begin including as independent variables in our regressions a dummy
variable for the common law system, a dummy for British colonies including
the UK itself,21 a measure of the percentage of protestants in the population,
a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and a resource abundance
18 The standard deviation is exactly equal to 1 in the complete sample, but because of missing data
it changes slightly in each sample.
19 Our results hold also for ordinary least squares estimations, but as expected weighted least
squares produce more ‘precise’ estimates (i.e. slightly higher t statistics).
20 One example of the special features that very small countries have is the more limited extent
of ethnoguistic fractionalization and the fact that they tend to be more open to trade (e.g. Knack
and Azfar 2003). Since small countries are included in corruption surveys only when they are more
interesting for investors, the over-representation of small countries with good investment climate
and low corruption levels could easily introduce in the sample a spurious correlation between
corruption, openness (negative) and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (positive).
21 Being a former-British colony should affect the degree of corruption because of the lasting effect
British occupation has on the organization of the civil service. The UK has that same civil service
organization and this is the reason for including the UK together with its former colonies in the
dummy.
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measure based on the percentage of fuels, metals, and minerals in exports.
These variables are predetermined by the history of the country or by natural
characteristics and can be considered fixed over long time scales. The depen-
dent variable is the corruption index from the World Bank for the year 2004.
The results are reported in Table 1.
In regression (1), we find results that throw some doubt on many conven-
tional findings. Specifically, while as in most previous analysis we do find a
strong correlation with some of the country fixed factors, we find that neither
the existence of a common law system or having been a British colony are
aspects associated with a country’s corruption levels. This result challenges the
hypothesis that having adopted the British law system or having a past as a
British colony reduces corruption at present day (e.g. Treisman 2000; Glaeser
and Shleifer 2002). When we compare Treisman’s work, where he found a Brit-
ish colonial past to be an important determinant of present levels of perceived
corruption, with the model and variables used in this study, we find that our
dataset is largely expanded (there are up to 107 countries in our regressions,
almost double the number of countries in the largest dataset fromTreisman) and
that the index of corruption we are using has a lower standard error associated
with it.22 We ascribe our finding to the fact that our dataset includes countries
that were not included in previous studies, are former British colonies, and are
also perceived to be very corrupt.23 As a British colonial past tends to overlap
with the Common law system,24 collinearity is a risk in considering these highly
correlated variables, and we also include them separately in the regressions.25
We still find the two variables to be individually non-significant.
In our analysis, one factor that significantly affects the level of corruption in
all regressionswith sufficiently large sample size is the percentage of Protestants
in the population, which is negatively associated with the level of perceived cor-
ruption. This finding relates to the theories of culture and the work of those
(Weber and Landes 1999 among others) that suggest that religion is a funda-
mental character shaping culture. The influence of the presence of Protestants
over corruption is confirmed over the different specifications and is always sta-
tistically very significant. It must be noted that, from regression (2) to (9), the
introduction of other independent variables more than halves the coefficient of
Protestant religion prevalence. The conversion of 20% of the population from
a non-protestant religion to the protestant religion (a one standard deviation
22 For a thorough comparison of the corruption perception index from Transparency International
and the one from the World Bank, see Kaufmann et al. 2005.
23 Our dataset includes former British colonies such as Myanmar and Sudan, which rank among
the countries where corruption is perceived to be the highest in the world. Data on these countries
has only recently become available.
24 The list of countries, in our dataset, that experienced British control, but did not adopt the
British legal system are: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Myanmar, Mauritius, and Oman. Countries,
included in the dataset, that adopted the British legal system without being colonies are: United
Arab Emirates, Liberia, Namibia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Thailand.
25 We also computed the variance inflator factors, for both variables, which were well below the
conventional level of 10.
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change) would be associated with a reduction in the corruption index by 0.2
points on an approximate 0–4 scale, that is one fifth of a standard deviation.
Associating the prevalence of fuels and minerals with corruption is not a
new concept. In an influential paper, Leite and Weidmann (1999) found that
corruption levels are statistically associated with natural resources and provide
a rent-seeking explanation. When compared to their analysis, our substantially
expanded dataset still finds the same association, though the relation is not as
strong as in their results. Thus, in our model, a change of 25% in the value of
natural resources on exports (i.e. a one standard deviation change) would be
associated with a change of 0.20 points in our corruption perception index.
In regression (2) we include, as a proxy for openness, the share of imports
in GDP averaged over of a period of 10 years. We find it not to be a significant
predictor of the corruption index. This result differs from Treisman who found
imports over GDP to be associated with a decrease of the corruption index, but
it corresponds with the results fromKnack andAzfar (2003) who have disputed
the link between trade intensity and corruption. The difference between results
can be ascribed to the propensity of smaller datasets to be affected by selection
bias. That is, earlier and less comprehensive surveys tended to include small
economies only when they were of interest for international investors who are
the main source of funding for the surveys. The selection thus favored small
countries that were open and not very corrupt.
The inclusion of income as an independent variable in Regression (3), causes
somemajor changes in all coefficients.26 Most notably, the ethnic division proxy
becomes insignificant (and remains insignificant after the inclusion of other
explanatory variables). It appears that ethnic diversity is not correlated per se
with corruption, but through lower income levels or through other variables
correlated to income, such as schooling. A similar effect occurs for the coeffi-
cients of the Protestants variable and of natural resources in exports, though
these coefficients remain significant.27
At the same time, we must emphasize that the inclusion of income as a
independent variable runs the risk of creating an endogeneity problem: since
corruption, and institutions in general, have been found to affect the growth
rate of income, and since institutional quality tends to be stable over time, it
is possible that corruption determines income levels rather than the other way
around.28 A possible strategy for tackling the issue of endogenity is the use of
26 The income variable refers to 2001.
27 Indeed, for natural resources there is a large literature on the ‘resource curse’ and the ‘Dutch
disease’, which have shown the detrimental effect that natural resources have on economic growth
(Stevens 2003).
28 On the direction of causality between institutions and income there is a large and growing
empirical literature. Most of the authors seem to agree that causality runs from institutions to
income, rather than the other way around (e.g. Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2001). For an
example of an econometric study finding the opposite direction in the causality between growth
and institutions, see Chong and Calderon 2000.
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instrumental variables. We identify latitude as a good instrumental variable29
(it is correlated with income at 60% and we find no ways through which it
could directly affect corruption). Latitude has been suggested as a determi-
nant of income by the proponent of theories of geography as a determinant of
economic development (e.g. Sachs 2001). Once latitude is inserted among the
independent variables, acting as an instrument for income, the coefficients of
the other independent variables tend to increase in magnitude and to become
more statistically significant (not shown in this paper). Most notably, the vari-
ables describing democracy, newspapers circulation and political instability (see
below) increase their coefficients. But, equally important, we do not find any of
the variables that we found not to be significant in the main analysis to become
significant when using the instrument.30,31
While the income endogeneity issue can be taken care of via the use of
instrumental variables, we prefer an alternative solution, using a lagged income
variable. The reason is that we are not so much interested in the coefficient of
income itself, which can be biased due to endogeneity, but we are more inter-
ested in the use of income as a control variable. Our aim is to filter out that part
of the coefficients for other independent variables that may go through income.
We thus use income to improve the robustness of our estimates. Summing up,
choosing to present results from the WLS regressions we favor type I errors,
but the difference with the results with the instrumental variables would not
alter substantially our conclusions.
One of the main findings of Treisman (2000) that contradicts existing lit-
erature (e.g. Fisman and Gatti 2002) is the trend for federalism to increase
corruption. We use as a proxy of power decentralization the share of expenses
that are delegated to local authorities as compared to the central government.32
Once we include such a proxy in our regressions, we do not find that decen-
tralization has a positive correlation with corruption. On the contrary, we find
the proxy for decentralization to have a negative correlation with corruption,
though the coefficient is not statistically significant. We interpret this result as a
29 A good instrumental variable must be highly correlated with the variable to be instrumented
and should not have additional explanatory power.
30 The only exception is contemporary democracy that becomes significant. In the analysis below,
we prefer to use and discuss the measure of medium-term persistence of democracy, because it is
significant even with the inclusion of income. In any case, the null hypothesis of exogeneity is not
rejected by the Hausman test.
31 A note of caution is needed when we analyze the results with the instrumental variable, because
theories that link geographical factors to institutions and through them to income levels have been
developed (Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001). If these theories are correct, latitude could
be used as an instrumental variable for corruption as well, and the interpretation of the 2-stage
results would become problematic. For our own dataset, we checked whether latitude could be
used as an instrument for corruption in a regression on income and found that latitude would not
be a valid instrument, because it retained explanatory power when added to corruption in the
regression.
32 Unfortunately, our proxy for decentralization is available just for a small sample of countries.
Once more statistics on government finance, uniform across countries, are available a more reliable
empirical test of the link between decentralization and corruption will be possible.
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weak suggestion that federalism does not increase corruption.33 One reason for
the difference between our findings and Treisman (2000) finding can lay in the
fact that Treisman uses a dummy variable to characterize a state as federalist
or centralist based on an incomplete list of federal countries in Elazar 1995.
Apart from its incompleteness, another problem of this list is that an officially
federalist country may in fact be overly centralized, where Mexico is a case in
point.34 The evidence is less than conclusive, as it is based on a sample of only 42
countries, but deserves to be mentioned as a matter that merits further inquiry
(see alsoArikan 2004). In the remaining regressions, the decentralization proxy
is omitted in order to keep a larger sample of countries.
The inclusion of a contemporary democracy variable in regression (4) does
not produce a significant coefficient. This result is different when compared to
most of the literature that specifically tests the democracy hypothesis. We con-
jecture that the reason for this is that most other models work with less control
variables (e.g. Hill 2003; Chowdhury 2004) or with smaller samples (Sandholtz
et al. 2000) leading to omitted variable bias. In the table, we introduced a proxy
for democracy from the Polity IV dataset (measuring democratic levels of insti-
tutions as judged by a panel of experts, averaged over the period 1994–2003).
As an alternative (not reported in the Table), we used a proxy from the Polyar-
chy dataset (measuring participation and competition at the elections through a
mathematical interpretation of elections results, also for the period 1994–2003).
None of the two democracy’s proxies seem to affect the corruption level, but
only when we exclude the income variable. Thus, it is possible that there is an
indirect effect of democracy levels through income on corruption (see Barro
1996; and the literature that has sprung from his work).
Constructing a dummy variable for stable democracies35 (where there are
no coups, or other major interruptions of the nature of the government, and the
country has democratic institutions in terms both of elections and of adminis-
tration of power), we find that a long exposition to democracy has a mitigating
effect on corruption. Thus, a ‘30 years of uninterrupted democracy’ variable
[as reported in regression (6)] is significant at 5%. The absolute size and the
statistical significance of the coefficient increases if more decades are included
in the dummy. A dummy characterizing countries that experienced 50 years
of uninterrupted democracy is significant at 1%. Our finding thereby presents
33 To be sure, we also included, as a proxy of the size of the country, the natural logarithm of the
population (as in Fisman and Gatti 2002), to account for the fact that countries with different size
may have different ‘natural’ centralization levels. Conform with previous literature, we did not find
the variable to be significant or to affect the coefficient of the decentralization variable.
34 In the United States of Mexico, central government spending exceeds the States and the local
governments spending together by more than three times. While the Mexican constitution is of
federal nature, political power is centralised in the country’s capital. ‘For most of the seven decades
of rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Mexico was a highly centralised one-party
polity. State governors, and even many mayors, were named by the president and answered to him,
even if they were duly elected, by fraud if need be’, see ‘Mexico’s truncated moves towards real
federalism’, March 27th 2003, From The Economist print edition.
35 We set the cut off point at the level of seven on a 0–10 scale of democracy in the Polity IV
variable.
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an intermediate position where it is not contemporary levels of democracy
that are significant predictor of corruption (e.g. Chowdhury 2004), but it is
also unnecessary to have 45 years of uninterrupted democracy as in Treisman
(2000). According to our estimates, more than 10, but less then 45 years of a
persistently democratic regime is sufficient to produce a significant dividend in
terms of corruption reduction.
An issue related to democracy that attracted some attention recently is the
role of press.We include the variable of newspapers circulation in order to catch
the possible effect of that the mass medias can play in reducing corruption. Our
empirical finding [regression (7)] supports the hypothesis that countries where
access to press is more wide spread will have less corruption.36
There are finally the theories related to government policies. Thus, we have
included in regressions (8) and (9) an index of government intervention in the
economy, a proxy of political instability, and a measure of wages in the public
sector. The proxy for government intervention in the economy is computed
using government consumption as a percentage of the economy, government
ownership of businesses and industries, the share of government revenues from
state-owned enterprises, and government ownership of property and economic
output produced by the government. While we do not find support for the
hypothesis that government intervention is associated with corruption, we are
cautious as to its interpretation, because an increase in government activities
in the economy can refer to both restrictions that provide more opportunities
for rents’ appropriation, but it can also refer to higher expenditures in educa-
tion and health, or in public goods in general. These in turn could be channels
through which corruption is diminished.
The political instability is obtained averaging the number of “veto players”
changes in the political system in each year. The variable we employ is a proxy
of political instability that recognizing the diffuse nature of political power in
most countries. It computes the total number of veto players in the political
structure and then evaluates the number of them that have changed in a year.
The results show that political instability seems to be significantly associated
with corruption, thus the shortening of the time horizons of politicians would
affect corruption levels. While evidence of this relation is tentative and would
deserve further testing, we highlight that this result is mostly due to the increase
in sample size and the use of a better proxy for political instability as compared
to Treisman’s work.37
Finally, we add government wage as an independent variable. We add this
government-related variable last, because of the fact that the variable is avail-
able only for a reduced sample (72 countries). The government wage is obtained
36 We also checked whether the interaction term between contemporary democracy and newspa-
pers circulation would be significant, controlling whether a free press together with a democratic
regime would have a special effect on corruption levels. In our regressions the interaction term was
not significant.
37 Treisman employed a variable that simply stated the number of government leaders changes in
each year.
L. Pellegrini, R. Gerlagh
by dividing the average wage in the public sector by GDP per capita. The gov-
ernment wage variable has the predicted negative sign, but is significant only
at 12%. Since the sample is relatively small, it is possible that with more data
on government salaries and a better proxy for the opportunity costs faced by
civil servants if they loose their jobs it would be possible to get a significant
coefficient.38
As a robustness check of our findings, we have run ordinary least squares
regressions with identical specifications, only with the Transparency Interna-
tional’s corruption perception index for 2004 as a dependent variable.39 We
find similar results, but with a slightly smaller dataset and decreased signifi-
cance of most coefficients.40 There are two differences in the estimates. First,
the share of fuels and minerals in exports tends to become statistically insig-
nificant in most regressions, and second, the import share in GDP is significant
when income is excluded as an independent variable. Subsequently, we used
the corruption perception index of the World Bank for the years 1996, 1998,
2000, and 2002 instead of 2004 as a dependent variable to check our results,
with the independent variables also referring to earlier years than in our main
analysis. Again, results are similar with two exceptions. Fuels and minerals in
exports tend to be slightly more significant in some regressions, and newspapers
circulation tends to be slightly less significant in some (other) regressions.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Our exercise contributes to the existing literature as it questions some central
findings of previous econometric studies.Most notably, for some historical char-
acteristics of a country that have been said to be a cause of corruption, we do
not find support. In our statistical analysis we do not find that the common law
system or a past as a British colony (negatively) predict corruption. Further-
more, we do not find any association between decentralization and corruption.
Moreover, the link between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and corruption is
diminished andbecomes insignificant once income is included in the regressions.
We do find systematic evidence that supports cultural theories of the causes of
corruption, in that the presence of Protestants in the population is found to
be associated with lower corruption. We also find that richer countries are less
corrupt. As mentioned above, caution is needed as there could be reverse cau-
sality from institutional quality to income, though the result is upheld using an
38 A better proxy would be the ratio of civil servants pay to service or manufacturing salaries (that
are not influenced by the share of population employed in the agricultural sector). Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2001) use the ratio of government wages to manufacturing wages and find it to be a
significant determinant of corruption levels. Their data sample, though, is limited to 31 countries
and data limitations do not allow us to follow their data.
39 The estimates if Transparency International’s margins of error have been shown to be biased
(Kaufmann et al. 2005), therefore we preferred the ordinary least squares, as a regression technique,
rather than the weighted least squares technique.
40 The sample size ranges between 98 and 67 countries.
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instrumental variable. Another finding shows that a long exposure (30 years)
to uninterrupted democracy is associated with lower corruption, that political
instability tends to raise corruption, and that the diffusion of newspapers is
associated with lower corruption levels. Finally, we also find some evidence of
an association of higher wages in the public sector with lower corruption.
What distinguishes our study from previous econometric works is, apart for
some different variable choices, a larger sample and we suggest that the most
notable differences with earlier studies can be traced to the inclusion of new
countries in the present study. We are aware of the limitations on the inter-
pretation of econometric results. Econometrics has a bias towards theories that
can easily be quantified. Case studies and more theoretical studies can act as
a necessary complement of this type of work (e.g. Johnston 2005). For future
research, we hope to follow two approaches. First, we want to investigate deter-
minants of corruption that are amenable to policy changes. This search can be
enhanced through the use of econometric analyses that identify the sources
of corruption at the micro level (e.g. Fisman and Miguel 2006; Miller 2006;
Reinikka and Svensson 2006). Second, we consider another relevant challenge
to be the collection of sufficient data for a panel data approach over a number
of decades. The combined cross-country—or cross-region—and intertemporal
analyses possible with panel data can be a key to finding other sources of
corruption.
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Appendix
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Corruption 106 0.00 1.07 −2.47 1.55
Protestants 106 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.98
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 106 0.33 0.30 0.00 0.89
Fuels and minerals 106 0.20 0.26 0.00 0.97
Imports 105 0.39 0.20 0.09 1.34
Income [ln(GDP) per capita] 106 8.38 1.19 6.20 10.39
Decentralization 42 0.33 0.28 0.02 1.33
Contemporary democracy 104 0.72 0.29 0.05 1.00
Newspapers circulation 104 1.10 1.48 0.00 7.60
Government intervention 106 2.94 0.75 1.50 4.70
Instability 105 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.41
Government wage 73 3.25 2.47 0.60 11.80
Corruption is the perceived corruption index 2004, from the World Bank
(see Kaufmann et al. 2005); Protestants is the share of Protestants in the pop-
ulation, Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is a average of five different indexes
based on linguistic groups (for the last two variables see La Porta et al. 1999);
Fuels and minerals equals to the share of fuels and minerals on exports,
L. Pellegrini, R. Gerlagh
averaged over 1993–2002, Income in the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in
2001, (the last two variables are from theWorld Development Indicators 2004);
Decentralization is the expenses of state and local government divided by the
central government averaged over 1993–2002 (from the ‘Government Finance
Statistics 2004’ of the International Monetary Fund); Contemporary Democ-
racy is the average of the institutional democracy score for the years 1994–2003
from the Polity IV dataset (see Jaggers et al.); Newspapers Circulation is daily
newspapers circulation for 10 people; Imports is a measure of the openness
of the economy and equals to the share of imports over GDP, averaged over
1993–2002 (the last two variables are from the World Development Indicators
2004); Government Intervention is an index for 2004 of the influence of gov-
ernment on the economy based on government consumption as a percentage
of the economy, government ownership of businesses and industries, the share
of government revenues from state-owned enterprises, and government own-
ership of property and economic output produced by the government (from
The Index of Economic Freedom 2005); Instability is the percentage of veto
players that changed every year, averaged for 1991–2000 (see Beck et al. 2000);
Government Wage is the average government wage as a multiple of GDP per
capita (from Schiavo-Campo 1998); British Colony is the dummy variable for
countries that have been under British control (from Treisman 2000 augmented
with information from Flags of the World Website http://flagspot.net/flags/gb-
colon.html); Common Law is the dummy variable for countries that adopted
the common law system in their commerical code (from La Porta et al. 1999).
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